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COMMENTARY
XENOPHILIA IN AMERICAN COURTS
Kevin M. Clermont* & Theodore Eisenberg**
INTRODUCTION

Foreigner! The word says it all. Verging on the politically incorrect, the expression is full of connotation and implication. A foreigner
will face bias.
By such a thought process, many people believe that litigants have
much to fear in courts foreign to them.' In particular, non-Americans
fare badly in American courts. Foreigners believe this. Even Americans believe this.
To illustrate these perceptions, we can draw on feedback to our
prior empirical work. In a letter regarding foreigners' success rates in
American courts, an insightful practitioner commented on his Japanese
clients' attitudes:
As you are probably aware, it is the widely held view in Japan that
Japanese litigants cannot get a fair jury trial because of anti-Japanese
bias among American jurors. Widely publicized losses for Japanese companies, [including] Honeywell's victory over Minolta in a patent2 case two
years ago, cement that view and get wide attention in Japan.
* Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University.
** Professor of Law, Cornell University. The Federal Judicial Center originally collected the

data used in this Commentary (federal court cases terminated during fiscal years 1987-1994); the
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research made the data available. Neither
the Center nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses presented here. We
would like to thank Desmond Derrington, Claire Germain, Robert Green, Robert Hillman, Kevin
Johnson, Sheri Johnson, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Shoichi Tagashira, and David Wippman for their comments, and the Cornell Institute for Social and Economic Research for its computer and data
support.
1 See WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 8-9, 13 (1995) (discussing
common concern about the home-court advantage in litigation).
2 Letter from Jay Cohen, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, to Theodore
Eisenberg r-2 (June 14, 1994) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (quoted with permission). The case reference is to Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera Co., in which a District of
New Jersey jury awarded $96 million. See Edmund L. Andrews, Minolta Told It Must Pay Honeywell, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1992, at 35; see also MASAYUKI TAKAYAMA & JULIA TACHIKAWA,
SOSHOBOKOKu AMERIKA: HYOTEKI NI SARERU ZAI-BEI NIKKEI KIGYO (AMERICA RUINED BY
LITIGATION: JAPANESE FIRMs DOING BUSINESS IN AMERICA ARE TARGETED] 3 (1995) (stating

that Japanese firms have been beaten through unfair judgments in American courts); Jack L.
Lahr, Bias and Prejudice Against Foreign Corporations in Patent and Other Technology Jury
Trials, 2 FED. CIRCUIT BJ. 405, 405 (1992) ("A widespread perception within the corporate communities of many industrial countries holds that they will be treated unfairly in U.S. jury trials
due to the jury bias and prejudice against foreigners.'); David Wippman, Dispute Resolution, 7
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In a circulated draft of an excellent article on alienage jurisdiction,
an American academic wrote:
[There is every reason to worry about whether foreigners can obtain an
impartial resolution of these disputes [with U.S. citizens] in the U.S. justice system. Xenophobia, long a staple of American life, might be expected to influence the litigation of such disputes.
Despite fears that judges and juries may be influenced by anti-foreign
bias, hard empirical data demonstrating such bias in the state or federal
courts is difficult to come by.... The existence of anti-foreign views in
the general public, and the influence of such views on the political process, is difficult to question. One would be surprised if such views did
not somehow influence the adjudicatory process. Consequently, there is
every reason to believe that the anti-foreign sentiment has some
effect

..

.

.3

Such views about American courts are understandable. After all,
the grant of alienage jurisdiction to the federal courts, both original 4
and removal, s constitutes an official assumption that xenophobic bias
is present in state courts. 6 As James Madison said of state courts: "We
well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get justice done them in these
courts . . . . 17 Moreover, given that sometimes even federal substan-

FLA. J.INT'L L. 93, 95-97

(1992) (discussing Latin American fears of bias); Helen Kahn, Supreme
Court Won't Hear Isuzu's Bias Argument, AUTOMOTIvE NEws, Mar. 8, 1993, at 16, available in
LEXIS, News library, Autonw file (reporting a Japanese company's accusations that it was the
victim of judicial bias).
3 Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? HistoricalFoundationsand Modern Justifications for FederalJurisdictionover Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming Feb. 1996) (manuscript at 4, 48, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (quoted
with permission, and with the acknowledgment that Professor Johnson now disputes the inferences that we draw from our data); see also Lahr, supra note 2, at 408-10 (suggesting that bias
may have a material effect on jury verdicts, although there is no empirical evidence).

4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994). Alienage jurisdiction is that subset of diversity jurisdiction

that grants the federal courts the power to hear cases between aliens and state citizens. See
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 41 n.a (5th ed. x994).
S See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). Alien defendants normally can remove without regard to
the bar to removal faced by in-state citizens. See 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUa R. MILLER
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723, at 330 (2d ed. 1985).
6 See Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547, 549,
563-64 (1989) (tracing the jurisdiction's original motivation to the Framers' concern that state-

court bias against British creditors would endanger the nation's foreign relations and commerce).
7

3

JoNATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 583

(Philadelphia, Lippincott 2d ed. x876).
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tive 8 and procedural9 law expressly disadvantages foreigners, it seems
reasonable to conclude that nonlegal bias sometimes also affects the
outcome in American litigation involving foreigners.
Available data, however, do not support the conclusion that xenophobia is rampant in American courts. In fact, in federal civil actions, 10 foreign plaintiffs and defendants win substantially more often
than domestic litigants. After presenting these data, this Commentary
discusses possible explanations for foreigners' higher success rates.
The best explanation is that foreigners are more selective in choosing
cases to pursue to judgment.
I.

EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS

We can compare the win rate of domestic and foreign plaintiffs in
three kinds of federal civil actions: domestic plaintiff versus domestic
defendant, foreign plaintiff versus domestic defendant, and domestic
plaintiff versus foreign defendant. In the wholly domestic case, the
plaintiff win rate is 64%. Foreign plaintiffs, however, win 8o% of
their cases. Finally, when domestic plaintiffs sue foreign defendants,
8 Because foreigners are not citizens, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i, they do not enjoy
any substantive right predicated on citizenship. They can neither vote, see id. amend. XV, nor

hold congressional office, see id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 & art. I, § 3, cl. 3. Federal law further permits
differential treatment of foreigners. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
261 (iggo) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches or seizures of a nonresident alien's property that is located outside the United States); Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 2o8 U.S. 570, 58o (I9o8) (recognizing a state's prerogative to favor domestic creditors over
foreign creditors); cf. Hilton v. Guyot, x59 U.S. 113, 227-28 (1895) (holding that the judgment of a
foreign court against a domestic debtor is not entitled to full faith and credit in United States
courts, absent specific statutes or international agreements to the contrary).
9 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 139i(d) (I994) ("An alien may be sued in any [judicial] district.');
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251-52, 255-56 (ig8x) (holding that in a forum non
conveniens inquiry, the special presumption in favor of the plaintiff does not extend to foreign
plaintiffs).
10 Unfortunately, because comparable state data are not available, we do not know foreigners'
success rates in state courts. We suspect, however, that state data are not substantially different
from federal data for two reasons. First, the level of actual bias should not be much less in
federal court than in state courts because federal and state juries and judges are largely similar in
characteristics and roles. See Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 199o B.Y.U. L. REv. 97, 120.
Even such differences as the selection of state juries from smaller geographic areas could sometimes reduce bias if an area were diverse and cosmopolitan; and the fact that state judges are less
insulated does not always imply that they are more biased. Second, as we shall argue, the perception of bias is more important than the existence of actual bias in affecting foreigners' success
rates. Because federal court has historically been viewed as more familiar and hospitable than
state courts, the effect of aversion to American litigation in elevating foreigners' success rates
would tend to be more pronounced in state data than in federal data. Given these offsetting
influences of actual and perceived bias, we think that the federal and state data would show
similar patterns. Indeed, other studies have found certain federal and state data to be similar.
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom & David Rottman, Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait x (June 26, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (reporting that win rates in jury trials in
federal and state courts are "strikingly similar").
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the plaintiff win rate drops to 50%. Thus, domestic plaintiffs fare
worse than foreign plaintiffs, and furthermore, domestic defendants
fare worse than foreign defendants.
We can multiply these numbers by their respective frequencies to
produce a single result that is fairly astounding. In actions between an
American and a non-American, non-Americans win 63% of the cases,
whereas, inversely, Americans win only 37%. Thus, the foreigner, as
plaintiff or defendant, does almost twice as well as the native. An
explanation for these significant differences is not obvious.
A.

Data Source

This Commentary uses data generated by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts." When any civil case terminates in a
federal district court, the court clerk transmits a form to the Administrative Office containing information about the case. The form reports
the subject matter of the case, its jurisdictional basis and removal status, the amount demanded, the filing and termination dates, the procedural stage at which the case terminated, the disposition method, and,
if the court entered judgment, the prevailing party and the relief
granted. The form distinguishes among many subject matter categories, including branches of contract, tort, and other areas of law. Since
fiscal year 1986, the form also specifies whether the two principal parties, in a diversity or alienage case, are American or foreign. 12 Unfortunately, the Administrative Office data do not contain many other
things one would like to know, such as particulars about the foreign
party.
Thus, our database comprises the 94,142 diversity and alienage
cases, ending in judgment for the plaintiff or defendant, that allow
11 The description of the data in this Commentary is condensed from Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. Rv.
1124, 1133-34 (1992). For easy access to this database, see Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form, http:llteddy.law.cornell.edu:8ogo/questatahtm (1995).
This Web site is discussed in Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace, 46
J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming Mar. 1996).
12 The Administrative Office (AO) compiles data according to fiscal year (FY). Because there
is a lag in implementing new codes, especially in data classified by termination date, we did not
include data for FY 1986. Data after FY i994 are not yet available. Thus, we used data for FY
1987-1994.
For FY 1987-1991, the fiscal year end was June 3o. Consequently, data for calendar year
1986 (from the first half of FY 1987) are presented here. Beginning with FY 1992, the fiscal year
end was September 30. Therefore, the AO data for FY 1992 cover i5 months rather than the
normal 12 months.
Because the data are organized by case, and not by parties to the case, one cannot observe the
fate of each party to each case. Across the thousands of cases in the data, however, one would
expect a strong correlation between the fate of cases and the fate associated with any party characteristics identifiable in the cases, such as the foreign status of a principal party. One would also
expect a strong correlation between the success of foreign principal parties and the success of
foreign parties generally.

[VOL. 109:1120
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calculation and comparison of win rates for domestic and foreign parties. 13 To be precise, the win rate is the percentage of plaintiff wins
among judgments for either the plaintiff or defendant. Judgments
comprise much more than trial outcomes. For Administrative Office
purposes, judgments might be the result of adjudication, consent, or
default, but they normally do not include voluntary dismissals. For
our purposes, we further narrowed the definition of judgments to inby the plaintiff
clude only those cases in which the data indicate a win
14
or defendant, not by both or by an unknown party.
B.

Results by Calendar Year

Figure i displays the data on win rates during fiscal years
1987-1994, aggregating all ninety-four federal districts and every case

category within diversity and alienage jurisdiction. It shows that foreign plaintiffs and defendants had consistently higher success rates
than domestic litigants had - what we term the "foreigner effect."15

13 We excluded 669 cases in which the plaintiff or defendant was a foreign nation, 338 cases
in which both principal parties were listed as aliens, and 4 cases in which residence data were
missing.
14 We discuss terminations other than "judgments," as we have defined that term, on pages
1139-40.

Is During fiscal years r987-1994, there was a sharp drop in the number of diversity and
alienage judgments. The domestic drop largely relates to the increase in the jurisdictional
amount-in-controversy requirement for cases commenced or removed in 1989 or later, as provided
in the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. ioo-702, § 201, 102 Stat.
4642, 4646 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994)). But the foreign decrease is steadier and
greater, owing in part to the classification of permanent resident aliens as state citizens by the
1988 statute. See id. § 203, 102 Stat. at 4646 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994)); see also
supra note 12 & infra note 22 (presenting additional explanations for the drop based on the lag in
seeing effects in data classified by termination date and on a temporary aberration in the foreclosure docket). In the Table below, data for the calendar years x986 and 1994 were calculated by
extrapolation from the stub years that fiscal year data provide:
NUMBER OF DlvERsiTY AND ALIENAGE JUDGMENTS BY YEAR

Calendar
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Foreign Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants
2,632
2,012
1,002
658
440
341
332
297
231

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants
8,630
9,803
11,642
11,854
10,097
8,902
8,932
8,116
7,367

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Foreign Defendants
2,938
2,393
1,395
936
614
509
366
343
332
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1986

1987

11'25

DOMESTIC ANiD FOREIGN WIN RATES BY YEAR

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Calendar Year

Of the three lines, the middle one shows the win rate in cases involving domestic plaintiffs and domestic defendants. The consistently
highest line shows the win rate in cases brought by foreign plaintiffs
against domestic defendants. In every year, foreign plaintiffs suing domestic defendants had a higher win rate than domestic plaintiffs suing
domestic defendants. The lowest line shows the plaintiff win rate
when domestic plaintiffs sued foreign defendants. In every year except
better than
one, foreign defendants sued by domestic plaintiffs fared
16
did domestic defendants sued by domestic plaintiffs.
C.

Results by Case Category

Table I presents the data, disaggregated by the subject matter of
the case. One possible explanation for the foreigner effect is that one
16 All the differences are statistically significant, except for the differences between foreign and
domestic defendants in 1992 and 1994. See infra note 17.
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or two unusual case categories account for the observed differences.
Table i, however, shows that the foreigner effect is not categoryspecific.
The fifth column in Table i shows the win rate when domestic
plaintiffs sued domestic defendants. For example, the win rate in insurance cases between domestic litigants is 48.25%. The sixth column
shows the win rate in cases involving foreign plaintiffs and domestic
defendants. For example, the win rate in insurance cases brought by
foreign plaintiffs against domestic defendants is 6o.58%. Foreign
plaintiffs thus won a higher percentage of their insurance cases than

did domestic plaintiffs. The seventh column reports the statistical significance of the differences between the win rates of domestic plaintiffs
and foreign plaintiffs. In insurance cases, for example, the statistical
significance of the difference between domestic-plaintiff and foreignplaintiff win rates is less than 0.0005, meaning that differences at least
as large as the observed difference would occur by chance less than
17
five times in io,ooo if the actual difference were zero.
17 One can view Table i as exploring the hypothesis that domestic and foreign parties are
equally likely to win their cases. By convention, the hypothesis being tested is called the null
hypothesis. See GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 64
(8th ed. I989) (explaining the process of statistical hypothesis-testing). The reported significance
levels, which are also called p-values, represent the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis
when it is in fact true. In this case, an incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis would lead to the
mistaken conclusion that domestic and foreign parties have different win rates. The p-value measures the likelihood that the observed differences in win rates are attributable to mere random
variation rather than real differences. See id. If the p-value is o.o5, for example, there is a 5%
probability that the observed or larger differences could occur by chance if in fact the null hypothesis were true. By arbitrary convention, p-values at or below the o.o5 level are described as
statistically significant. See THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE

IN THE COURTS 197 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989). Throughout this Commentary, we use the
term "significant" in the formal statistical sense of significance level.
The significance levels in columns 7 and 9 are the product of a process meriting additional
explanation. With respect to column 7, a separate significance calculation was done for each of
Table i's rows. For example, for insurance cases in which the court entered judgment for the
domestic or foreign plaintiff or the domestic defendant, we constructed a 2 X 2 table in which
foreign-plaintiff status (no or yes) constitutes the rows, and judgment for defendant or plaintiff
constitutes the columns. The table shows that the plaintiff won 6o.58% of the foreign-plaintiff
cases. In contrast, the plaintiff won only 48.25% of the wholly domestic cases. A two-sided
Fisher's exact test shows that the p-value, or significance level, is < o.ooo5. For a discussion of
the benefits of Fisher's exact test over Chi-squared tests of significance, see ALAN AGRESTI,
ANALYSIS OF ORDINAL CATEGORICAL DATA II (1984), which indicates that Fisher's exact test is
preferable when cell counts are small.
INSURANCE CASES

(Number of judgments in parentheses)
Foreign
Plaintiff
No
Yes

Judgment for
Defendant
51.75% (5,044)
39.42%
(300)

Judgment for
Plaintiff
48.25% (4,703)
6o.58%
(461)

A similar 2 X 2 table was constructed for each row in Table i,thus yielding a column 7 value
for each case category. Column 9,the second significance column in Table I, was constructed in

1128
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The eighth and ninth columns shift the focus to foreign defendants.
The eighth column lists the plaintiff win rates when a domestic plaintiff sued a foreign defendant. The ninth column reports the statistical
significance of the differences between the win rates in the fifth and
eighth columns.
In seventeen of the twenty categories, foreign plaintiffs did better
than domestic plaintiffs against domestic defendants. In every category yielding a significant difference, foreign plaintiffs did better than
domestic plaintiffs.
Similarly, foreign defendants won more often than did domestic defendants across most categories. Again, in most categories with a significant difference, foreign defendants outperformed domestic
defendants.
A closer look at the data in Table i reveals part of the explanation
for the foreigner effect. Consider the case categories in which plaintiffs
generally won a high percentage of their cases. The high-win categories of General Contract and Foreclosure represented 49% of all
wholly domestic cases, but they constituted 68% of foreign plaintiffs'
cases. On the other hand, the two biggest tort categories, which were
the relatively low-win Other Personal Injury and Product Liability,
represented 18% of all wholly domestic cases, but only 4% of foreign
plaintiffs' cases. Foreign plaintiffs thus appear to have a tendency, relative to domestic plaintiffs, to bring a greater proportion of high-win
category cases. This tendency, by itself, would raise foreign plaintiffs'
overall win rate.
Because virtually all the case categories show the foreigner effect,
foreigners' preference to litigate certain categories of cases could not
explain all of the foreigner effect. Nevertheless, this case-category shift
suggests that other analogous shifts in the set of cases that foreigners
litigated might contribute to the observed win rate pattern.' 8 Perhaps
such shifts account for all of what we are seeing as the so-called foreigner effect. To investigate the possibility that the sole explanation
for foreigners' higher success rates lies in the different mix of cases
that foreigners litigated, we need to investigate foreigner win rates
while simultaneously holding other case characteristics constant. Regression techniques allow us to do this.

a similar manner, except that the underlying 2 X 2 table uses foreign defendant status (no or yes)
as the rows.
Is For example, a similar shift lies in the time trend of declining win rates and the number of
alienage judgments: a greater proportion of foreign plaintiffs' cases come from the high-win early
years, thus raising foreign plaintiffs' overall win rate. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

19963
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D. Isolating the Foreigner Effect
Multivariate regression isolates the independent effects of various
factors, such as time trend and case category, on win rates. 19 The
dependent variable - what we are trying to explain - is whether the
judgment for a plaintiff is a win or a loss. The regression uses a
broad set of independent variables, which includes whether one of the
parties is foreign. A few additional empirical observations will help
set the stage for the regression.
First, removal plays a role in producing the perceived foreigner effect. In wholly domestic cases, 16.49% of the judgments were in cases
that had been removed to federal court from state court, and these
removed cases have a characteristically low plaintiff win rate of
33.6o%.2o For foreign plaintiffs, however, only 2.07% of judgments
were in removed cases, with a plaintiff win rate of 45.99%. For foreign defendants, not surprisingly,2' the removed rate jumps to 26.78%,
with a plaintiff win rate of 34.95%. Thus, the shifting removal pattern
foreign plaintiffs' having fewer low-win removed cases and foreign
defendants' having more - would have the impacts of raising the foreign plaintiff win rate and lowering the win rate against the foreign
defendant, both impacts being consistent with the foreigner effect.
Second, the geographic distribution of foreign parties' cases also
helps explain the differences between domestic and foreign win rates.
In fiscal years 1987-1994, the Second Circuit's district courts rendered
6.78% of the judgments in domestic cases with a win rate of 66.5i%,
whereas the Seventh Circuit's district courts rendered 17.02% of domestic judgments with a win rate of 85.o8%.22 Foreign plaintiffs were
more concentrated in these two circuits than were domestic plaintiffs:
the Second Circuit's district courts decided 15.91% of foreign plaintiffs' cases with a win rate of 81.35%, and the Seventh Circuit's district courts decided 26.28% of foreign plaintiffs' cases with a win rate
of 93.38%. Foreign defendants also saw a shift toward the Second
Circuit (13.59% of judgments and a win rate of 57.96%), but there
19 Multivariate regression is a statistical technique that quantifies the independent influence of
several factors (independent variables) on the phenomenon being studied (dependent variable).
See generally MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEViN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 323-467
(ggo) (applying regression analysis to various legal issues). Because the dependent variable is
dichotomous (judgment for plaintiff or defendant), we use logistic regression. See DAVID W. HosMER, JR., & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTC REGRESSION I (1989).

20 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 8o
x55 n.i8 (1995) (discussing the effect of removal in lowering win rate).
21 See supra note 5. As the rate of removal goes up, one would expect the effect of removal
in lowering the plaintiff win rate to dilute and hence lessen. The high rate of removal by foreign
defendants probably explains the relatively modest effect of removal on the win rate of the plalntiffs suing them.
22 The Seventh Circuit's high figures largely result from an abnormally large number of almost-sure-win foreclosure cases terminated during I986-x989. This aberration also helps to explain the decline in the federal courts' caseload shown in note i5.
CORNELL L. REV. 1507,

(VOL. 109:1120

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1130

was a shift away from the Seventh Circuit (6.58% of judgments and a
win rate of 49.91%) where plaintiffs generally litigate successfully.
Thus, it is necessary to control for circuit in the regression.
Third, for domestic parties only, the Administrative Office data
distinguish between individual and corporate parties. In our database,
domestic and foreign plaintiffs faced corporate defendants 52% and
20% of the time, respectively. Corporate plaintiffs sued domestic and
foreign defendants, respectively, 43% and io% of the time. Because
corporate litigants generally outperform individual litigants, 23 foreign
parties' less frequent interaction with corporate litigants would tend to
24
increase foreign parties' success rates.

Accordingly, the independent variables in the regression must include year of termination, case category, how the case came into federal court, judicial circuit, and whether the domestic party was a
corporation or not. We also included other variables that we shall discuss later in this Commentary: state citizenship of American parties,
amount demanded, procedural progress, and disposition method.
There were 58,747 cases containing all of the data needed to perform
the regression analysis. Table 2 presents the results.

23 See Table 2, infra p. II3I; cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution 30 (May 6, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) (observing that corporate parties are more likely to win at
trial than are individuals).
24 The numbers for the various combinations of plaintiffs and defendants follow:

DOMESTIC

AND FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS AGAINST
INDIvWDUAL AND CORPORATE DEFENDANTS

Percent of Total Judgments
Domestic
plaintiffs
Domestic P v. individual D
Domestic P v. corporate D
Foreign P v. individual D
Foreign P v. corporate D

Foreign
plaintiffs

48.00
52.00
-

-

79.91
20.09

-

Plaintiff
Win
Rate
74.16
55.49
83.27
66.69

INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE PLAINTIFFS AGAINST

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
Percent of Tbtal Judgments

Individual P v. domestic D
Corporate P v. domestic D
Individual P v. foreign D
Corporate P v. foreign D

Domestic
defendants
57.08
42.92
-

Foreign
defendants
-

90.09
9.91

Plaintiff
Win
Rate
52.23
80.72
49.19
57.77

1996]
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LoGIsTIc REGRESSION RESULTS

(Dependent variable = judgment for plaintiff)
Significance
Coefficient
Independent Variable
0.461
Foreign plaintiff
0.000
-0.352
Foreign defendant
0.000
0.000
-0.043
Calendar year
*
Case category dummy variables
Case origin
**
Original proceeding
-0.526
Removal jurisdiction
0.000
*
Other origin dummy variables
*
Judicial circuit dummy variables
0.000
0.479
Corporate plaintiff
-0.179
Corporate defendant
0.000
0.250
Out-of-state plaintiff
0.000
0.000
-0.129
Out-of-state defendant
0.000
-0.013
Amount demanded (million $)
Procedural progress
**
Early stage
0.000
0.120
Middle stage
0.041
-0.148
Trial stage
Method of disposition
**
Default judgment
0.000
-0.886
Consent judgment
0.000
-4.086
Pretrial motion
0.000
-2.800
Trial method
0.000
-2.926
Other methods
0.000
88.836
Constant
Chi-squared (51) = 29095.68; Prob. > Chi-squared below 0.00005;
Pseudo R-squared = 0.3972; Log Likelihood = -22078.649
* not separately reported
** reference category

When all those variables are held constant in the regression, foreignness continues to have a sizable and significant effect on win rate. Foreign plaintiffs win more often than their domestic counterparts (the
independent variable "foreign plaintiff" has a positive coefficient of
0.461), and foreign defendants lose less often than their domestic counterparts (the independent variable "foreign defendant" has a negative coefficient of 0.352). Both results are highly significant statistically. The
foreigner effect shown in Figure i and Table i thus survives this more
sophisticated analysis.
The logistic regression results also permit estimation of the magnitude of the foreigner effect. Using the coefficients for foreign plaintiffs
and foreign defendants from Table 2, one can calculate the approximate
change in the chance of winning attributable to a party's foreign status.
Compared to a domestic case with a 50% chance of the plaintiff's win-
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ning, an apparently identical case brought by a foreign plaintiff will enjoy a 61.3% chance. 25 Alternatively, substituting a foreign defendant for
the domestic defendant will drop the 5o% chance of the plaintiff's winning to 41.3%.
I.

TENTATIVE EXPLANATIONS

In summary, foreigners win a substantially higher percentage of
their cases in federal court than do Americans, whether plaintiff or
defendant. The question now becomes why they do so. After rejecting
the notion that American courts have a pro-foreign bias, we next argue that foreigners' fear of American courts leads them to pursue only
an unusually strong set of cases. This explanation is consistent not
only with the results reported above, but also with the additional data
analyzed below.
A.

Xenophilia and Other Direct Explanations

One possibility, of course, is that American courts favor foreign litigants, perhaps to encourage foreign commerce. However, this possibility seems remote at best. We doubt that popular perceptions of
xenophobia could be that far off. Nevertheless, we present this possibility to stress the principal point of this Commentary: the available
data offer no support for the belief that there exists xenophobic bias in
American courts. We are not saying that anti-foreign bias is necessarily nonexistent, and we are not arguing for the abolition of federal
alienage jurisdiction. The parties' strategic behavior, based on their
expectations, could be masking the bias and offsetting its influence to
such a degree that an opposite foreigner effect appears in case outcomes. But any xenophobic bias that does exist in American courts is
perhaps less serious than commonly thought.
An explanation of the data more plausible than xenophilia is that
foreign litigants simply perform better than the average domestic liti25 In multivariate logistic regression, each estimated coefficient provides an estimate of the
corresponding variable's effect on the logarithm of the dependent variable's odds. See HOSMER &
LEMESHOW, supra note x9, at 58. The odds multiplier is obtained by taking the anti-log of the
regression coefficient. For example, the regression coefficient for foreign plaintiffs in Table 2 is
o461. This coefficient corresponds to an odds multiplier of e°46' = 1.586. An odds multiplier of
1.586 means that, with all other variables held constant, the presence of a foreign plaintiff
changes the odds of the plaintiff's winning from i:i to 1.586:1. Odds of x:x correspond to a
probability of winning of So% (I/(i + i)). Odds of 1-586:1 correspond to a probability of winning
of 61.3% (1.586/(1.586 + i)), as stated in the text. Similar calculations yield the 41.3% figure
reported in the text.
The regression results showing a foreigner effect are quite robust. We have explored models
that omit combinations of the other independent variables in Table 2, and the foreigner effect
survives. Thus, it is not a major problem that some of the independent variables in the model,
such as disposition method or procedural progress, may be endogenous to the dependent variable.
In addition, when we control for the fact that the data are censored in that some filed cases were
not yet terminated, the results do not materially change.
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gant, because they have better cases on the merits or merely better
lawyers., For example, one might hypothesize that foreign litigants, on
average, are relatively wealthier and retain elite American law firms
that both settle and litigate more effectively. In fact, a slight superiority in litigation capability may very well exist. 26 Yet it is hard to believe that such a difference would have an impact sizable enough to
explain the foreigner effect seen in the data. Moreover, it is difficult to
understand why the effect of such a difference in capability would not
largely disappear through the settlement process, with the residues of
domestic and foreign cases that go to judgment becoming similar with
respect to win rate.2 7 Nevertheless, to the extent domestic and foreign
sides differ specifically in their ability to evaluate the chance of success
at trial, the settlement process would not equalize win rates; this 23difference could help to explain a small part of the foreigner effect.

In sum, explanations along such lines appear to be either unlikely
or weak. An explanation of a very different sort is necessary.
B.

Foreign Aversion to American Courts

We believe that the most plausible and powerful explanation for
the foreigner effect is that foreigners are reluctant to litigate in
America for a variety of reasons, including the apprehension that
American courts exhibit xenophobic bias2 9 and the pecuniary and nonpecuniary"0 distastes for litigating in a distant place. Foreigners aban26 See Leslie Helm, U.S.-Japan Battle of the Patents:Japanese Firms Are No Longer Quick to
Settle American Claims to Lucrative Inventions, LA. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at Ai, Ag ("Japanese
. . . hire the best litigators, the 'best samurai in the forest.'" (quoting a Silicon Valley patent
attorney)).
27 According to the well-developed theory of case selection, the selection of adjudicated cases
results in a biased sample of the mass of underlying disputes. When the outcome is clear, a case
tends to settle readily, because both parties can save the extra cost of further litigation by settling
in accordance with their knowledge of the law and facts. Cases will go all the way to adjudication only when the parties substantially disagree on the predicted outcome of trial. Difficult cases
falling close to the applicable standard tend not to settle, because the parties are more likely to
disagree substantially in their predicted outcomes. These unsettled, close cases fall more or less
equally on either side of the standard, regardless of the underlying distribution of disputes. The
settlement process therefore produces a residue of adjudicated cases with some nonextreme win
rate. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (discussing the effect of case selection on equalizing win rates).
28 See Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial:
A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 325-27 (1988)
(discussing the effect, under case selection theory, of differential capabilities on win rate).
29 See supra pp. 1120-22.
30 Nonpecuniary distastes might include not only uncertainties and fears about an unfamiliar
legal system, but also particular cultural aversions to litigation. See, e.g., Helm, supra note 26, at
Ai, Ag (reporting that the Japanese are risk-averse and averse to confrontation).
The database permits some inquiry along these lines, because it names the first of the named
plaintiffs and of the named defendants. We looked for Asian and Hispanic names in the database
for fiscal year 1993. The foreigner effect appeared more pronounced for Asians and nonexistent
or reversed for Hispanics. This difference could be seen as some confirmation of the aversion
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don or satisfy most claims 31 and, presumably, persist in the cases that
they are most likely to win. Thus, cases involving a foreign litigant, as
plaintiff or defendant, are usually cases in which the foreigner has the
stronger hand.
A stronger set of cases will tend to affect directly the win rate in
the cases going to judgment.3 2 Although the settlement process generally mutes that effect on win rate, greater pecuniary and nonpecuniary
costs to the foreigner of litigating a case will create differential stakes
that will lead to a greater incentive for the foreigner to settle weak
cases and thus keep the settlement process from eradicating the effect. 33 Moreover, if both sides and their lawyers misperceive bias, so
that they wrongly believe that the court will favor the domestic party,
then the settlement process will produce a residue of cases going to
adjudication in which the foreigner will do better than expected and
thus perpetuate the foreigner effect. 34 Whereas domestic litigants may
choose to litigate close cases, foreign litigants probably settle the close
cases and litigate only the especially strong ones.
Therefore, foreigners' reluctance to come before American courts,

together with its subsequent effects on the settlement process, skews
the caseload in such a way that foreign plaintiffs win substantially
more often than the ordinary domestic plaintiff, and foreign defendants lose substantially less often than the ordinary domestic defendant.

At least three possible explanations exist for the persistence of foreigners' aversion, which endures despite the fact that these litigants
have repeatedly observed the results of individual cases. First, surprising and longstanding misperceptions about the legal system are not
explanation, assuming that the greater attention in the press to Japanese aversion indicates a
lesser Hispanic aversion, but we would need a much sounder methodology before putting any
reliance on such findings.
31 See, e.g., id. ("Japanese have often sought to quietly settle disputes" rather than litigate in
America, which "is still regarded as a courageous act by many in Japan."); Linda Himelstein &
Neil Gross, Japan in the Dock: Beware of the Bashers, Bus. WK., Nov. 8, 1993, at xoi ("Japanese
companies routinely choose to settle cases because they believe they won't get a fair shake from
an American jury." (citing a New York lawyer specializing in Japan)); Clayton Jones, U.S., Japan
Closer to Pact on Patent Procedure, L.A. TmiFs, Oct. 12, 1992, at D3 (citing a survey of 173
Japanese firms that reported that they were involved in 207 patent-infringement suits filed by
non-Japanese firms, which were mainly American, but had satisfied out of court 248 other
claims). Foreign plaintiffs probably have a freer hand in deciding to avoid litigation than do
foreign defendants; thus, one would expect the slightly greater foreigner effect for foreign plaintiffs
that the data exhibit. Moreover, foreign defendants are arguably less the subject of misperceived
bias, see infra pp. 1135-38; if so, the foreigner effect in adjudicated cases involving foreign defendants would lessen.
32 See Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and
Plaintiff Victory, 203 J. POL. ECON. 229, 232-35 (995) (discussing the effect, under case selection
theory, of case strengths on win rate).
33 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note ii, at 1131 (discussing the effect, under case selection theory, of differential stakes on win rate).
34 See id. at 1131-32 (discussing the effect, under case selection theory, of misperceptions on
win rate).
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uncommon. 35 Second, this particular aversion seems to accord with
human beings' fundamental world views, which are based on experience and anecdote. 36 Third, empirical evidence to the contrary has
been nonexistent.
Of course, not all foreign litigants are necessarily loath to come to

American courts. Product-liability plaintiffs from abroad might even
be characterized as eager.37 This tendency may account for the small
foreigner effect seen in Table i for foreign product liability plaintiffs.
However, a number of insights diminish the force of such an observation regarding specific foreign attraction to American courts. First,

even a small foreigner effect suggests that foreign plaintiffs might still
be more reluctant than domestic plaintiffs to resort to American
courts. Second, America's magnetic draw for plaintiffs does not explain the foreign defendant effect in product liability cases, 38 a phenomenon that continues to require foreign aversion as an explanation.
Third, such category-specific, plaintiff-specific eagerness does not de-

tract from a general explanation based on foreign aversion to American courts - especially when product liability judgments accounted
judgments compared to 8.69% of
for only 1.74% of foreign-plaintiff
39
judgments.
domestic
wholly
3S See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 734 (1992) ("Despite a widespread impression of everincreasing awards in products cases, evidence of recent declining real-dollar awards is about as
persuasive as is evidence of increasing awards."); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What
Shapes Perceptions of the FederalCourt System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 539 (i989) (concluding
that many observers of constitutional tort litigation have "exaggerated perceptions"). See generally
THOMAS GILOvCH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO 3 (iggi) (discussing "imperfections in our
cognitive and inferential tools"); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 3 (i980) (arguing that people's "attempts to understand, predict, and control events in the social sphere are seriously compromised" by
"underutilization of normatively appropriate strategies and overutilization of more primitive intuitive strategies").
36 See supra pp. 1120-22.
37 See DAVID EPSTEIN & JEFFREY L. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION § 1.02, at i-8 to
I9 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. i99s). But cf. GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 222 (2d ed. 1992) (mentioning reasons foreigners
might avoid American courts).
38 See Table I, supra p. 1I26.
39 The lack of success of foreign defendants in the Medical Malpractice and Airplane Personal
Injury categories, seen in Table I, requires a specific explanation also, but none is very obvious.
Worth noting, however, is that, of the domestic cases in our database, these two categories have
the two highest rates of completed trial. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No:
A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319,
364 & n.iio (iggi) (medical malpractice); Eisenberg, Goerdt, Ostrom & Rottman, supra note io,
at 9 (medical malpractice); Paul Zaffuts, The General Aviation Accident SettlementlLitigation Dei
cision: An Empirical Examination of Selection Theory 36 (Spring I99 )(unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Perhaps the usual reluctance of defendants to
settle cases in these categories, combined with foreigners' failure to appreciate the bite of American substantive law in these categories until their cases are in the hands of their American law-
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C. Supporting Observations
The database includes additional information about the domestic
and foreign cases. Subsequent tables set out information on procedural progress of the cases before termination, method of disposition,
amount demanded, amount awarded, and time on the docket. Observations based on such additional information form a panorama consistent with our explanation of foreign aversion to American courts.
i. Procedural Progress at Termination. - The database includes
information on how far a case had proceeded at the time of judgment.
The codes conveying this information group into "early," which means
termination before filing of an answer or before any court action;
"trial," in which judgment was entered during or after trial; and "middle," which comprises the other codes for termination following court
action after an answer was filed but before trial was commenced.
As Table 3 shows, the foreigner effect is present at every stage.
The effect weakens toward trial, effectively disappearing for foreign
defendants, arguably because the cases by then are solidly in the
hands of American lawyers and have almost survived the settlement
process. Yet misperceptions of bias, especially regarding foreign plaintiffs, seem to preserve some foreigner effect even at trial.
TABLE 3. WIN RATES BY PROCEDURAL STAGE AT TERMINATION

(Percentage of judgments won by plaintiff)
Procedural
Stage

Foreign Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Foreign Defendants

Early
Middle
Trial

91.82
71.22
64.27

84.29
51.81
52.99

70.22
38.28
51.36

More interestingly, perhaps, Figure 2 displays the shifting percentages of cases terminated at each stage. It shows that foreign plaintiffs'
cases terminate disproportionately at the early stage, whereas foreign defendants' cases proceed disproportionately to trial. This difference is
consistent with the hypotheses that foreign plaintiffs arrive on American
shores with surprisingly strong cases and that foreign defendants come
willing to defend resolutely the weak cases against them.

yers, leads to more cases reaching American courts. Such a lessened aversion would produce a
lower rate of success for the foreign defendants.
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JUDGMENTS BY PROCEDURAL STAGE AT TERMINATION

FIGURE 2.
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Thus, breaking down the data by termination stage provides support for the view that reluctant foreigners litigate only their strong
cases in America. Their aversive behavior affects not only win rates,
but also how far the cases are litigated.
The database also indicates the
2. Method of Disposition. method of disposition that led to judgment or other termination.
Whereas the previously discussed procedural progress at termination
represents the stage, or time, at which termination occurred, the
method of disposition instead tells the procedural method, or device,
for disposing of the case.
Figure 3 divides up the judgments by method: default judgment,
consent judgment, judgment on pretrial motion (such as a motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 or 56), judgment upon trial,
and unusual method (such as judgment on award of
or some other
40
arbitrator).
40 The win rates on pretrial motion are 39.17% for domestic cases, 59.81% for foreign plaintiffs, and 26.48% for foreign defendants. The win rates upon trial are 52.88%, 64.37%, and
So.66%, respectively. The win rates on all judgments by methods of disposition other than pretrial motion or trial are 92.34%, 95.34%, and 8247%, respectively (and on consent judgments
alone, the win rates are go.86%, 9346%, and 83.81%, respectively).
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3. JUDGMENTS BY METHOD OF DISPOSITION

Foreign Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Foriegn Defendants

On the one hand, Figure 3 shows that foreign plaintiffs obtain far
more default judgments than do domestic plaintiffs. This comparison
suggests that foreign plaintiffs have a powerful set of cases. On the
other hand, foreign defendants suffer far fewer default judgments than
do domestic defendants, with a concomitant increase in trials. This
difference suggests that foreigners choose to satisfy the stronger claims
against them before reaching American courts.
3. Trial by Jury or Judge. - This line of analysis focusing on procedural distinctions prompts inquiry into the differences between jury
and judge trials. We can look at twelve sizable case categories in
which litigants have a clear choice between a jury and a judge trial.4 1
Our interest lies in fully tried cases. Table 4 shows the results for this
subset of the database.

41 The twelve categories are Negotiable Instruments; General Contract; Torts to Land; Airplane Personal Injury; Assault, Libel & Slander; Marine Personal Injury; Motor Vehicle Personal
Injury; Other Personal Injury; Medical Malpractice; Product Liability; General Fraud; and Torts
to Personal Property. These categories are the same ones we studied previously on judge and jury
differences. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which
Is Speedier?, 79 JUDICATURE 176 (1996). That study also included a thirteenth category, Federal
Employers' Liability, which does not rest on diversity jurisdiction. See id.
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Jury trials
Judge trials
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WIN RATES IN JURY AND JUDGE

TRIALs

Foreign Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Foreign Defendants

Number

Win rate

Number

Win rate

Number

Win rate

401
418

61.10
72.25

9,337
3,653

50.63
61.32

1,664
641

50.00
54.60

Thus, the foreigner effect prevails before both jury and judge, with
foreign plaintiffs and defendants outperforming their domestic counterparts in both settings. That is, this Commentary's principal observation
and explanation apply whether one is speaking of jury or judge trials.
It is true that foreign plaintiffs do better before judges than before
juries, according with the popular view that juries are particularly xenophobic. 42 However, plaintiffs in domestic cases also do better before
judges than before juries. Moreover, even domestic plaintiffs suing foreign defendants do better before judges than before juries. Thus, the
data do not suggest that juries are more xenophobic than judges.
Rather, the data probably reveal that the widespread view of juries as
generally pro-plaintiff is a misperception. This misperception leads to
disappointed expectations that are reflected, after the settlement process,
in a lower plaintiff win rate among jury-tried cases. 43 This general jury
effect overwhelms any actual difference between judges' and juries'
xenophobia.
It is also true that the difference in win rates before judges and juries for foreign plaintiffs exceeds that difference for foreign defendants,
with the difference in wholly domestic cases falling in between. This
observation might support the view that juries are xenophobic. However, regressions within each of the three groups of cases, with the dependent variable being judgment for plaintiff and the independent
variables being case categories and trial mode, show the effect of jury
trial on win rate to be insignificant for foreign litigants. Thus, one
should not infer differences between judge and jury.
4. Nonjudgment Terminations. - The foregoing analysis prompts inquiry into cases that do not end in judgment, and thus takes us beyond
the database utilized to this point. We can look at the same set of diversity and alienage categories, but not limit the focus to judgments, and
then examine disposition codes for terminations other than judgments.
These codes group into "dismissals," which normally indicates settle42 See Leslie Helm, Jury Orders Nintendo to Pay $208.3 Million in Patent Case, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1994, at D3; Jones, supra note 31, at D3; Andrew Pollack, Japanese Fight Back as U.S.
Companies Press Patent Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1992, at Ai (reporting that Japanese see the
American jury system "as both inscrutable and biased against them"); P.W. Young, Current Topics, 69 AUSTL. L.J. 931, 931 (1995) (arguing, in general, that local juries are biased against for-

eigners and, in particular, that American juries are biased against Australians). Further evidence
that foreigners perceive American juries as biased lies in the small percentage of jury trials for
foreign plaintiffs, who evidently opt not to have jury trials.
43 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note ii, at 1133.
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ment, and "others," such as transfer or remand. Table 5 divides up all
terminations by method, showing as expected that settlement is the major route out of court. It also shows that many more cases are brought
against foreign defendants than are brought by foreign plaintiffs. 44
TABLE 5.

METHOD OF DISPOSITION OF CASES

Foreign Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Domestic Plaintiffs v. Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants
Foreign Defendants
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
79,223
19
8,313
15

Number
6,606

Percent
30

Nonjudgment dismissals

13,517

62

257,693

63

37,257

67

Other nonjudgments
Total

1,834
21,957

8
100

74,487
411,403

18
100

10,027
55,597

18
100

Judgments

Foreign plaintiffs go to judgment more often, relative to domestic
plaintiffs. Foreign defendants, to the contrary, obtain more dismissals, as
compared to domestic defendants. These tendencies are at least consistent with the hypothesis that foreigners generally have strong cases.
Considering terminations other than judgments reveals a broader importance of the existence of a foreigner effect among judgments. judgments include only a small part of all settlements, but they do include
some settlements in the form of consent and default judgments. The
foreigner effect observed in those kinds of judgments reflects foreigner
strength in imposing settlement terms. 45 Presumably, the foreigner
strength seen there and in the rest of the judgments would carry over to
influence all nonjudgment settlements and other resolutions of disputes. 46 However, foreign aversion to litigation may cause some foreigners to avoid winnable disputes by abandoning or satisfying claims.
Similarly, foreigners may be disadvantaged in negotiations if misperceptions of xenophobia prevail at the negotiating table. In these ways, the
observed foreigner effect has importance in grievance-remedial and dispute-resolution alternatives to judgment.
5. Case Size. - Returning to the judgment database, we see in Table 6 that foreign plaintiffs' cases tend to be relatively small cases,
whether measured by demand or award. That foreign plaintiffs nevertheless pursue these cases is consistent with their having a high chance
of winning. However, the small size of these cases is still surprising.
The explanation of foreign aversion to American courts forecasts that
the expected award for foreign plaintiffs will be higher than the expected
44 Of the foreign-defendant cases, 12,393 were asbestos cases, of which 97.40% were nonjudgments. Without asbestos cases, the domestic percentages in Table 5 would be 21, 66, and 13,
respectively; the foreign-plaintiff percentages would be unchanged; and the foreign-defendant percentages would be i9, 7o, and ii, respectively.
45 See supra note 40.
46 Success rates in nonjudgment settlements should correlate with win rates in dispositions by
judgment See Theodore Eisenberg, Negotiation, Lawyering, and Adjudication: Kritzer on Brokers and Deals, 29 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 275, 292-93 & n.64 (1994).
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award for domestic cases, not lower. Yet Table 6 shows a lower expected award for foreign plaintiffs. The reconciliation between what one
forecasts and what one observes lies in the rapid decrease in the number
of foreign cases in recent years. 4 7 Recent years have seen higher average
awards across many case categories. 48 A class of cases, such as those
brought by foreign plaintiffs, that is sparsely represented in recent years
will have relatively fewer high-award cases and thus a lower expected
award. When one controls for the declining number of foreign-plaintiff
plaintiff cases do have a higher expected award
cases over time, foreign 49
than do domestic cases.
Meanwhile, cases against foreigners are characterized by big demands, but not big awards. This pattern suggests a blustering plaintiff
with a lower chance of winning. Domestic plaintiffs may believe that
xenophobia exists in the court system to a greater extent than it does.
Their misperception leads them to bring a relatively weak set of cases
against foreign defendants and to inflate claims with an aim to intimidate. Because of the lower win rate, cases against foreigners have a
lower expected award than do domestic cases.
TABLE 6. MONETARY AMOUNTS DEMANDED AND AWARDED
(I994 dollars)
Foreign Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants
913,198
Mean Demand
73,155
Median Demand
1,061,064
Mean Award, if any
101,894
Median Award, if any
848,215
Expected Award*
* win rate times mean award

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants
1,153,940
95,196
1,409,927
105,773
908,698

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Foreign Defendants
2,045,194
223,494
1,398,520
129,267
699,819

Incidentally, cases involving a foreign plaintiff or defendant last
longer from filing to termination, as shown by Table 7. The longer duration implies an increase in costs, which reinforces the points that cases
involving foreigners are small cases and that the foreigners will likely
win them. The overall picture becomes ever more consistent with the
explanation of foreign aversion to American courts.
47 See supra note is.

See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 35, at 784.
We analyzed expected awards by running a tobit regression, with the dependent variable
being the square root of the expected award and the independent variables being foreign plaintiff,
foreign defendant, and calendar year. The calendar year variable, in effect, controls for the higher
award trend in recent years. Notably, the coefficient for foreign plaintiff is highly significant and
strongly positive, whereas the coefficient for foreign defendant is highly significant and strongly
negative.
Tobit regression is appropriate because the dependent variable is truncated at zero. See JAN
KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS 560-62 (2d ed. 1986). Similar results are obtained if one
uses ordinary least squares regression.
48

49
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TABLE 7. DURATION OF CASES
(Days on docket)
Foreign Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Domestic Defendants

Mean

446

387

729

Median

259

280

574

D.

Domestic Plaintiffs v.
Foreign Defendants

Diversity Analogy

Our explanation of the foreigner effect posits foreign aversion to
litigating in American courts rather than any special treatment or capabilities of non-Americans. Thus, one would expect to see a similar
effect on win rate in domestic diversity cases as a result of out-of-state
parties' similar aversion to coming in to litigate with in-state adversaries. In fact, one does see that effect in the database. For example,
out-of-state individual plaintiffs suing in-state individual defendants
have a win rate of 67.78%, whereas in-state individuals suing out-ofstate individuals have a win rate of only 57.o6%. An out-of-state corporation suing a corporation either incorporated or having its principal
place of business in the forum state has a win rate of 84.47%, whereas
an in-state corporation suing an out-of-state corporation has only a
66.66% win rate. Instead of faring poorly, nonlocals are apparently
selective about the cases they litigate away from home and, therefore,
enjoy an elevated win rate.5 0
Moreover, foreigners do better in federal court against in-state adversaries than they do against out-of-state adversaries.5 1 Perhaps the
reason is that the effect of aversion in elevating foreigners' win rate
diminishes when the adversary is also averse to the forum.

So In a regression similar to the one that produced Table 2 - but only for diversity proceedings between out-of-state and in-state Americans (fiscal years 1987-x994) - the coefficient for
out-of-state plaintiff was 0.358, with a significance level at < o.oooS.
s The numbers for the various combinations of plaintiffs and defendants follow:
FoREIGN PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DOMESTIC DEFENDANTS

Foreign
Foreign
Foreign
Foreign

P
P
P
P

v.
v.
v.
v.

in-state individual D
out-of-state individual D
in-state corporate D
out-of-state corporate D

Percent of
Total Judgments

Plaintiff
Win Rate

64.79
15.12
16.70
3.39

84.53
77.88
69.54
52.68

DoMEsTIC PLAINTIFFS AGAINST FOREIGN DEFENDANTS

In-state individual P v. foreign D
Out-of-state individual P v. foreign D
In-state corporate P v. foreign D
Out-of-state corporate P v. foreign D

Percent of
Total Judgments
76.17
13.92
8.76
1.15

Plaintiff
Win Rate
46.53
63.79
56.46
67.71
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A general principle begins to emerge: parties' aversion
elevates their win rate. More immediately, the fact that
win rate carries over from the foreigner context in alienage
to the out-of-stater context in diversity jurisdiction gives
support to our aversion explanation.
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CONCLUSION

The available data indicate that foreigners do very well in the federal courts. They win a higher percentage of their cases, whether as
plaintiff or as defendant, than do their domestic counterparts. Thus,
the data offer no support for the existence of xenophobic bias in American courts.
Our explanation for this "foreigner effect" in case outcomes lies in
foreigners' aversion to American courts. Because of this aversion, foreign litigants who reach judgment generally have unusually strong
cases, which have not encountered the expected bias. The data perhaps suggest, therefore, that foreigners would be wise to lessen their
general aversion to litigation in the United States.
More importantly, these findings about foreigners in American
courts reveal a deeper problem with knowledge of the legal system.
Most observers probably have believed that judgments run against foreigners in American courts. As usual, even basic descriptive data
about the functioning of American courts was lacking. This Commentary demonstrates the need to verify, notwithstanding compelling anecdotal evidence, deeply held beliefs about how the legal system works.

